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Airproxes

These are short and incomplete summaries only. Full reports are available on www.airproxboard.org.uk

Report Number
Date
A/c A
A/c B
Location 
 
2016076
15 May 16
LS8
Biplane
1nm W Tewksbury

THE LS8 PILOT reports that he was about 1km west of Tewkesbury. He had been circling right hand in a thermal and straightened up to continue en-route. About 15 seconds later, while looking down and to his right, he saw another aircraft heading straight for him and assessed that it would hit him if they both continued on their current trajectories. He turned to his left and climbed then continued on track to increase the separation.

Neither aircraft were seen on any radar recordings which resulted in the Biplane pilot not being able to be traced. The Board quickly determined that although the LS8 pilot had seen the Biplane late, he had probably successfully carried out a turn to increase their separation. For his part, given the apparent lack of reaction by the biplane pilot, the Board thought that he probably did not see the LS8.
2016077
15 May 16
PA28
Drone
Blackpool

THE PA28 PILOT reports descending on final approach to land when the right, rear-seat occupant pointed out a blue quadcopter drone. The drone was operating at the airfield boundary and displaced approximately 200m north from the threshold as they descended through its level. The drone was seen to be manoeuvring in all 3 axes. Blackpool ATC was informed after they landed.

The Board noted that drone flight within an ATZ is prohibited in without the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit, in this case Blackpool ATC, who confirmed that no such permission had been given. On the basis that the drone operator should not operate his drone in a location that would ‘recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property’, the Board determined that the cause of the incident had been that the drone had been flown into proximity with the PA28.
2016082
22 May 16
C152
Beagle Pup
Redhill

THE C152 PILOT was inbound to Redhill and was asked to report at the M25/M23 junction. Upon doing so he was given joining instructions and began his descent. Whilst on base leg, and descending, he saw an aircraft passing right to left directly overhead, but there was little he could do because the Beagle Pup was seen so late.

THE BEAGLE PUP PILOT declined to take part in the Airprox process.

THE BOARD were disappointed that the Beagle Pup pilot had declined to take part in the Airprox process to the detriment of identifying flight safety lessons. They learned from the R/T transcript that he had booked out for a westerly departure, and that the controller had cleared him to hold and to depart for a Buckland departure. However, although the pilot had readback the instruction to hold, he didn’t readback the Buckland departure.

Turning to the C152 pilot, the Board noted that he had heard the Beagle Pup being cleared to depart to the west, and, having not been given any Traffic Information on anything in his vicinity, would have understandably expected his join to be clear of other traffic.

The Board quickly agreed that the Beagle Pup pilot had not complied with his clearance to depart to the west. However, they thought that there had been two contributory factors, firstly that the Beagle Pup pilot had not readback his clearance, and secondly that the controller had not challenged that lack of readback
2016083
20 May 16
EV97
Extra 200
Conington
THE EV97 PILOT was teaching circuits on RW28L. They turned and called downwind to land, which was acknowledge by Conington A/G. At the base-leg turn, the instructor suddenly noticed a blue and white Extra closing very fast from the left, behind and about 100ft above. He instigated a descent and a left turn to avoid, whilst the Extra continued on a straight and level path. Both the instructor and the student were shaken by the event and the instructor took control and landed the aircraft.

THE EXTRA PILOT reports that he is hard of hearing and that Conington are familiar with his non-radio flights, during which he makes blind radio transmissions. On this day, he had booked the non-radio arrival for later that morning which Conington accepted. RW28 was relayed to him together with the QFE, and was told to make a standard overhead join, which he confirmed that he would do. Upon arrival he made a blind radio call “descending dead side for downwind join for runway 28, left hand, transmitting blind.” He believed that because his non-radio approach was booked, the tower would communicate as necessary with other aircraft in the circuit. He followed the normal overhead join circuit, and, as he crossed the airfield overhead RW16, he was approximately at 1000ft. He had seen the grey aircraft depart when he was deadside and assumed it had left the circuit because he couldn’t see it again. He turned downwind, and called ‘downwind transmitting blind’. He then turned final and again transmitted blind and at that point saw the grey aircraft on the threshold. He went around, transmitting blind as he did so. He then repeated the circuit and was given a green light on calling finals. He opined that Conington tower must have appreciated that he was doing a non-radio approach in order to give him the green light. He was, confident that he performed the overhead join correctly, and this was backed up by his GPS.

THE BOARD referring to the CAA medical guidelines regarding hearing difficulties, noted that GA flight was permitted with some restrictions such as not flying in CAS. It was noted that in this instance the Extra pilot had done all he could to pre-warn the A/G operator at Conington of his approach. Members thought that his habit of suffixing R/T calls with ‘transmitting blind’ could be mis-leading for other pilots who might expect that he was still able to receive messages. The Board then referred to the CAP 413 Radiotelephony manual and found that a more fitting phrase would be the recommended ‘Transmitting blind due to receiver failure'. The Board quickly agreed that although it had been unfortunate that the Extra pilot’s efforts to pre-warn Conington had not succeeded, the root cause of the incident remained that the Extra pilot had not integrated with the EV97 in the visual circuit. However, they agreed that there was a contributory factor that the Conington A/G operator had not been informed about the Extra pilot’s non-R/T join.
20160
28 May 16
C172
EV97
Kemble

THE C172 PILOT reports that he was in the visual circuit at Kemble. A visiting aircraft had flown a rather wide circuit, outside of the usual traffic pattern. There was also an Ikarus in the circuit, and both the Ikarus and he flew a wider circuit to fit in with the visitor. After the visitor had landed, the AFISO advised that the Ikarus was number 1 and the C172 number 2. On passing 600ft, and now straight-in, an EV97 came into view in the 2 o’clock position, 400m ahead, at the same altitude and from the usual baseleg position. He assumed that the other pilot had missed that he should have been number 3 in the pattern and was conforming to the regular pattern.

THE EV97 PILOT reports that the student was flying and they were aware that some visitors had been flying large circuits. At the end of the downwind leg, as they turned base, the instructor took control to demonstrate the correct application of flap to improve forward visibility. The instructor applied the flap, the nose dropped, and they saw an aircraft approaching from the final position. The instructor applied full power and climbed away as the other aircraft passed beneath them.

THE BOARD quickly agreed that the EV97 pilot had not integrated effectively with the C172, but that there were contributory factors that the visual circuit had been busy and that the EV97 pilot had not assimilated that he was number three in the pattern.

 

 
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