Aeroplanes
Because of the wide implications, this non-UK regd fatal accident has been included
23 December
Rockwell Commander 112TCA: N4698W: Kinglassie, Fife, Scotland
AAIB Introduction and Conclusion
Following a normal take-off roll, on the initial climb-out the aircraft’s engine lost power due to water ingestion in the carburettor. The aircraft was observed to depart from controlled flight and it struck an area of rising ground, fatally injuring the pilot. The loss of engine power after take-off was caused by water ingestion into the carburettor’s main nozzle, due to significant water contamination of the aircraft’s fuel system. The pre-flight inspection was not effective in removing all the water present in the fuel system and the investigation has not been able to determine which pre-flight checks were completed prior to the flight. The presence of a significant quantity of water in an aircraft’s fuel system is a serious safety hazard. In such cases it is possible that an entire fuel sample tube, drained from the fuel system, may contain only water yet still produce an odour of AVGAS when smelled. The 50 year old pilot had flown187 hrs with 92 on type and 19 hrs in last 90 days. (AAIB Special Bulletin S1/2025)
27 August
Piper PA-18-150: G-CUBX: Croft Farm Airstrip (Defford airfield), Worcestershire
AAIB Synopsis: G-CUBX tracked to the left on the runway during takeoff and within two seconds of getting airborne it was in a left turn tracking toward obstacles south of the runway. Witnesses reported seeing the aircraft adopt a steep nose-up attitude, but it was not able to climb above a tree which was one of the obstacles in its path. G-CUBX appeared to have struck the tree at the apogee of its flight path before descending steeply, nose-first, into the ground. The pilot suffered fatal injuries at the point of ground collision. It was not possible to conclusively establish why the aircraft diverged left during and after take-off. Nonetheless, the investigation considered it likely the relatively low lift off speed of approximately 34 kt contributed to the pilot having insufficient aerodynamic control authority to effectively counter the flight path divergence. Being in a turn rather than wings level would have compromised the aircraft’s climb rate resulting in it being unable to climb above the obstacles it was turning toward.
The investigation was unable to find evidence of any pre-accident fault with the aircraft. The 65 year old pilot had flown 1,520 hours with three on type and nine hours in the previous 90 days. (AAIB Bulletin 7/2025).
28 July
Cessna FRA150L Aerobat: G-PPFS: nr. Thorganby, N. Yorks
The aircraft crashed killing the two occupants. (Source: ASN)
28 July
Spitfire Mk26B: G-ENNA : Enstone Airfield, Oxfordshire
AAIB Synopsis
The aircraft yawed left during the take-off roll, pitched up rapidly and once airborne rolled rapidly to the left. The left wingtip struck the ground and the aircraft came to rest inverted and caught fire. The pilot was fatally injured. The investigation found that the aircraft most probably stalled during the rapid pitch up and that the ensuing left roll and yaw occurred as a result of a post-stall autorotation. Examination of the aircraft, while limited to some extent by the disruption caused by the impact and fire, did not reveal any technical defects which may have adversely affected the controllability of the aircraft. No definitive cause was established for the loss of control.
Conclusion
Immediately after take-off the aircraft stalled during a rapid pitch up. Control was lost and the aircraft rolled and yawed left as a result of a post-stall autorotation. The left wing struck the ground, the aircraft came to rest inverted and caught fire, and the pilot was fatally injured. Despite the extensive damage sustained during the impact and ensuing fire, there was no evidence of a malfunction or failure of any of the aircraft’s flying control systems that would explain a loss of control. It was possible that the pilot did not control the yaw during the take-off run, initiated a rapid pitch up to lift off before running off the side of the runway and, in so doing, began the sequence of events. Although the medical evidence did not permit a definitive conclusion, it was also possible that the reason for the loss of control was that the pilot became incapacitated to some extent during the take-off.
The 71 year old pilot held an ATPL and had flown 21,740 hrs with 19 on type. (AAIB Bulletin 1/2026)
13 July
Extra EA-200 G-EEEK Spanhoe Airfield, Northants
AAIB Synopsis
After flying to Spanhoe Airfield, Northamptonshire, the pilot of G-EEEK pitched the aircraft into a vertical climb and completed a manoeuvre from which the aircraft entered an upright flat spin to the left. The aircraft was not recovered before it struck the ground, and the pilot was fatally injured.
The investigation was unable to establish why the pilot flew such manoeuvres, unapproved and at low level. It was not possible to exclude a control restriction or a pilot incapacitation for the lack of sufficient recovery before the aircraft struck the ground. The 65 year old pilot had flown more than 4,076 hrs, with 1,100+ on type and 225+ hrs in the preceding 90 days. (AAIB Bulletin 2/2025).
26 March
Cirrus SR22T: G-RGSK: Duxford Airfield, Cambs
AAIB Synopsis
At the end of a third circuit, which was intended to be a touch-and-go, G-RGSK bounced on touchdown. The pilot applied full power to go around but lost control of the aircraft, which turned left through approximately 90° before striking the ground. The aircraft’s ballistic
parachute system deployed during the impact sequence. It was found that the aircraft had approached the stall as the nose attitude was increased for the go-around, triggering the stall warning. The tendency for the aircraft to yaw and roll left was not controlled, causing the aircraft to turn left, and the aircraft then stalled during the turn. The pilot, the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The 58 year old pilot had flown a total of 115 hrs with 16 on-type.
To warn and protect people who may be unfamiliar with aircraft ballistic parachute systems (BPRS), such as the emergency rescue services and others, from the potential danger, two Safety Recommendations are made concerning the provision of clear, conspicuous and unambiguous markings. The UK Civil Aviation Authority has published a Safety Notice (SN -2025/003) on the same topic. (AAIB Bulletin 5/2025).
Microlights
1 September
Sportstar SLM: G-CMGB: Chesterfield, Derbyshire
AAIB Synopsis
After departing Coal Aston Airfield, the pilot of G-CMGB encountered weather that was not compatible with flight under VFR. Following a series of descending orbits overhead Chesterfield, the aircraft departed from controlled flight and struck the ground, fatally injuring the pilot.
AAIB Analysis Overview
The accident sequence began when the aircraft entered meteorological conditions that were less than those required for flight in accordance with VFR. It is likely that when the pilot recognised the situation and was attempting to regain visual references, the aircraft departed from controlled flight. The pilot died from injuries sustained when the aircraft struck the ground. The post-mortem examination determined that there was no indication
of medical impairment or incapacitation of the pilot before the aircraft struck the ground.
AAIB Conclusions:
The accident occurred when the aircraft struck the ground after departing from controlled flight. This resulted from the aircraft entering meteorological conditions that were incompatible with flight under VFR and exceeded the pilot’s experience and capabilities. Meteorological forecasts had indicated that conditions were likely to improve during the morning of the flight, with a low probability of thunderstorms developing along the planned
route. The pilot amended his original departure time to avoid what he perceived as poor flying conditions to arrive at his destination before the weather deteriorated. However, the weather conditions at the time of departure were below the minimum required for flight under VFR. The pilot was not qualified to fly in IMC and the evidence indicated that he subsequently lost control of the aircraft. Examination of the aircraft did not identify any pre-existing defects or anomalies that may have contributed to the accident.
The 71 year old NPPL pilot had flown 390 hours with 181 on type and had flown 46 hours in the last 90 days. (AAIB Bulletin 11/2025)..
Gliders
5th June
Mini Nimbus C: G-CFGH: Barlavington, West Sussex
AAIB Synopsis: The pilot took off with the intention to conduct an endurance flight lasting five hours. In the early stages of the flight the pilot successfully gained height in two separate thermals. After approximately 30 minutes of flying, the pilot turned 180° to track back towards the airfield. Without any further significant height gains, the glider eventually descended through the height at which BGA guidance suggests a field landing should be initiated. The glider’s flightpath suggests the pilot did not intend to commit to a landing and at low level an apparent attempt was made to gain height in a thermal. The glider gained a small amount of additional height, but during this manoeuvre two loss of control events occurred, both consistent with a stall and wing drop. The pilot appeared to recover controlled flight during both incidents but lost height and following the second recovery, the glider came into contact with the tops of trees. This resulted in significant damage to the glider, and it struck the ground causing fatal injuries to the pilot. The pilot was appropriately trained, experienced and qualified to conduct the flight and the weather was suitable, although described as challenging by other pilots who flew that day. Whilst not considered to be causal, a contributory medical factor could not be excluded. It was not possible to determine why the pilot elected not to follow the relevant training to conduct a field landing at the appropriate opportunity. The 73 year old pilot had flown for 100 hours of which 19 hrs 43 mins were on type, and with 25 hours in the last 19 days. (AAIB Bulletin 7/2025)
25th May
Discus B G-BJMD and Standard Cirrus G-DCTB: Hinton-in-the Hedges airfield, Northants
Synopsis
Having completed their flying tasks in a local club competition, gliders G-DJMD and G-DCTB returned to Hinton-in-the-Hedges airfield, and both aircraft manoeuvred to the north-east of the airfield in preparation for an approach to land. The competition required pilots to report their position on the radio when downwind and when on final, but neither pilot was heard to do so, meaning a critical opportunity to alter the outcome was missed, and they remained unaware of each other’s presence until they collided on short final. The pilot of G-DCTB suffered serious injuries. The pilot of G-DJMD was struck by G-DCTB’s wingtip during the collision and the glider then struck the ground in an inverted attitude. The pilot of G-DJMD suffered fatal injuries. The investigation identified the following causal factor related to the collision:
+ The pilots did not effectively communicate their location or intentions on the radio, and the unalerted ‘see-and-avoid’ principle was insufficient for either of them to be aware of the presence of the other in time to take avoiding action when joining the circuit and on final approach. The investigation made the following findings:
+ When an aeronautical radio station is licensed and approved to provide an Air Ground Communication Service, the service must be provided inside published hours of operation, unless promulgated otherwise by NOTAM or other suitable means.
+ Glider pilots must hold a Flight Radiotelephony Operator Licence if they communicate with an air traffic control or flight information unit, or an Air Ground Communication Service.
Safety action was taken by:
+ The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to remind radio licensees of their obligation to provide the service approved on their licence, and to ensure that approvals under the Air Navigation Order accurately reflected the responsibilities of licence holders.
+ The British Gliding Association (BGA) to promulgate information on the avoidance of midair collisions.
+ The respective gliding clubs to clarify their requirements for the use of radios by pilots
The 45 year old Dicus pilot had flown 129 hrs with 43 on type and the 29 year old Cirrus pilot had flown 104 hrs with 4 on type. (AAIB Report dated 30th Oct 2025 in assets.publishing.service.gov.uk )
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