Fatal Accidents (2)

A Pitts S1 apparently spun into terrain during or following aerobatic manoeuvres. 

A glider released from aero tow at about 300ft and crashed, killing the pilot.

Airprox/Near Miss Reports (22)

Occurrence Reports (87)

Engine Failures (15).  Six resulted in a forced landing, three of these occurred after take-off.  One partial failure resulted in a rejected take-off, six partial failure events returned to base nearby.  Complete engine failure in a twin necessitated a diversion. In one case the throttle jammed or failed when fully open, necessitating a forced landing from overhead the base airfield.
Smoke and Fire Events (2).
Canopy Detached (1), from a Slingsby T61, injuring both occupants.
Alternator/Electrical Failure (3).
Landing Accidents (11), excluding runway excursions, two were gliders.
Hit Obstacles on Approach to Land (4), unknown phase of flight (1).
Hit Obstacles Following Late Go-Around (1).
Loss of Control on Take-Off (1)
Burst Tyres on Landing (1).  A significant improvement, keep checking tyre pressures!
Taxiing Accidents (7), all involving taildraggers or castoring nosewheels.
Maintenance Reports (7)
Runway Excursions (7)
Runway Incursions (14)
Wrong Runway (3)
Level Bust IFR (4)
TCAS RA (3).
ATC Coordination of GA IFR Flights (5)

Airspace Infringements (95)

Of which 4 were of danger areas, 10 were of ATZ’s, 2 were gliding sites and 4 were RA(T)s.  Contributory factors included:
(S indicates factors where systemic improvement may be helpful)

Climbing too soon after flight beneath CAS (3).
Take 2 Guidance not followed (4).  This means 2nm laterally and at least 200ft vertically from CAS boundaries.
Misread the chart and/or electronic displays (7) could be identified but the real number is probably higher.  S.
Manchester LLR (3). S
Transponder Mode C over reading (6), sometimes grossly.  S
London FIS (9).  This is often not the most appropriate service to use. Commonly a/c working the FIR enter the Channel Islands CTR without clearance, perhaps believing that London will tell them when to change frequency or obtain clearance for them.  Elsewhere, the FIR would not seem to be an appropriate service when flying in the vicinity of or underneath CAS.  Guidance on those services the FIR can provide would be helpful.  S.
Frequency congestion or no reply (4). S.
Requested CTR transit but clearance not received (2).
Instructor distracted by task (2).  Other causes of distraction were passenger (1), looking for and avoiding traffic (2), and GPS failure (3).  One unusual one in a helicopter with a newly qualified pilot ultimately intending to land at a private site was in carrying out fuel checks on a navex prior to the landing.   The fuel quantity required on arrival was critical, i.e. enough for the return flight to base, not known if there was a weight consideration limiting fuel quantity for departure.  Hindsight is a wonderful thing: forget the NAVEX, just plan to land at destination with a suitable fuel quantity.  Do the NAVEX another time.
VHF Com Failure (4)
Lack of route planning (3) identified but too high an altitude (7) could be considered to be in this category.
Missed Sky Demon or other warning (4). S
Instrument scan too infrequent, particularly of the altimeter and VSI (3).
Not listening to the published frequency when using the FMC.  This draws attention to the several services an aircraft may legally be using in busy areas. S
Altimetry (3).  One infringer was using the RPS, one the wrong QNH and one most probably had QFE set. S
Weather factors were reported in (9) cases. These were variously avoiding cloud, flying higher to avoid or reduce turbulence, strong thermals and entering a heavy rain shower.

I will end with a matter of safety management.  Some reports are annotated with a conclusion; ‘root cause: pilot error’ is a favourite.  Legally, any infringement is pilot error; the aircraft is somewhere it is not permitted to be so the pilot must be at fault.  The question to be answered is why the pilot made that error.  If 100 pilots make comparable errors each month it would be worth examining the causes if there is an intention to reduce the frequency of these errors.  Corrective action could be taken if there is a will to do so.  If no remedial action is taken, it suggests that the current situation is considered to be acceptable.