Occurences (86)

Engine Failures (17).  All were partial failures, involving  rough running, warnings such as ECU fail, fire warning or other indications including propeller failure.  Two events occurred immediately after maintenance.
Airprox Reports (19).
Landing Accidents (1), excluding runway excursions.
Runway Excursions (5).
Runway Incursions (7).
Wrong Runway (3), including one take-off from a taxiway. 
Tyre Failures (2).
Maintenance Reports (11), all relevant and valuable.
Taxiing Collisions (1).
Pitot Covers Still on for Departure (1).
Loss of Comms (4).  One case was due to the wrong frequency being selected.
Electrical Problem/Failure (1).
Take-off, Landing or Backtrack Without Clearance (4).
IFR Level Bust (2)
Wake Turbulence Encounters (3).  All were severe and included a B737 on approach 8nm ahead of the light aircraft, at FL230 a turbo-prop single encountered moderate to severe turbulence from an A330 above and 8-10nm ahead and a helicopter on a London low level route encountered similar from an A380 on approach to LHR.
Exhaust Pipe Fell Off in Flight (1).
Engine Cowling Detached in Flight (1).
Crashed into Wooded Areas during attempted take-off or landing at private strips (2).  No details, subject AAIB investigations.
CO Electronic Warning (1), pilots felt fuzzy.

Airspace Infringements (98)  

S suggests that systemic improvements could be considered.  Contributory factors were:

Inadequate planning (5). Due to delays and weather, one pilot changed the route to be flown for sound reasons but did not fully familiarise himself with the airspace on the new route. In another case there was a need for a flying school to position an aircraft to another airfield, a route not flown by the instructor before. This is not an uncommon requirement: and an instructor may feel inadequate by saying “It will take me an hour to plan a flight to XXX.”As mentioned in an earlier issue, some simple flights had been very carefully planned in advance yet an infringement still occurred, which illustrates the complexity of our airspace. The complex shapes and bases are neither memorable nor readily identified. (S).
Weather Factors (5). One involved a forced landing at a private strip, a bold and evidently correct decision.Another in a microlight with a presumably non instrument rated pilot declared an emergency at FL095 above cloud and could see no way down.D&D on 121.5 were able to assist a safe outcome.The others were lateral deviations to avoid cloud, reduced visibility into sun and trying to remain on top of cloud, then infringing the base of CAS.
Visually avoiding traffic (6+1).One was due to a traffic warning device that issues no avoiding commands; the traffic was never seen. The last was a TCAS RA that was correctly followed.
 (8).  In five cases the transponder mode C was over reading. In one of these the pilot knew it was over reading and flew a lower altitude, but could not safely go low enough to prevent an automated infringement warning. In one case the transponder would not accept a squawk code change, causing distraction. In two cases the transponder was difficult and time consuming to select by its location – on the lower right side of the instrument panel behind the control wheel. Some designs involve selecting and entering each digit with a single knob. Get one wrong and you start again. These would not seem suitable for aircraft and the common mode C altitude errors need addressing. Reports of intermittent transponder signals from low level aircraft in the southwestern Stansted TMZ occur monthly; there may be a reception problem. (S)
Lack of Knowledge (6) was candidly admitted in some reports, one was from a recently qualified PPL holder flying an ambitious route around the London zones. Another experienced pilot did not understand the rules for TMZ transit. One pilot was evidently foreign, but these events illustrate the complexity of navigating British airspace
Climbing too early after flight beneath a CAS base (2).
Take Two (3). Flying at an altitude too close to the base of CAS or laterally too close to the boundary.
Misidentified surface features, lateral navigation error or misread the moving map (4).
Flying too wide a circuit or turning too late after departure (3).One pilot suggested remedial action was to make better use of the moving map, though this may not be the most appropriate way to fly a visual circuit.
Confusion of CAS bases 
(4). This occurs whether using a paper chart, moving map or both. (S).
Altimetry (3). One instructor misread the altimeter by 1,000ft while conversing with the student during the climb. One pilot departed an airfield having significant elevation and situated beneath CAS with QFE set, (S).Use of the Regional Pressure Setting may have played a part in another event (S).
TMZ and Manchester LLR (3), due correct squawk not set in time.
ATZ and gliding site infringements (6). It would be wise to assume for planning purposes that ATZ’s are permanently active. Military airfields often have gliding or light aircraft operations even when the MATZ is closed.
RA(T)s (2). It is noted that the number of RA(T)’s in summer months have multiplied.
Danger Areas (3) (S).
Frequency congestion and ATC workload (4)