Fatal Accidents (4)

Airprox Reports (12).

Occurrence Reports

Engine Failures (14), including rough running.  (Enma Tigre, Lycoming (4), Continental, TAE125, Potez4E20, Jabiru (2), Rotax (2).
Fuel Exhaustion (2). Both were Pipistrel Electric. One received an in-flight message BATTERY R NOT PRESENT; as is often the case on similar displays that may not exactly describe the problem.  The drill involves pulling the rear battery CB and a safe landing was made on a PAN call.  The second involved 4 go-arounds due to strong winds at destination; a landing accident occurred on the fifth attempt which was forced due to lack of remaining battery charge.
Landing Accidents (13). 
Take-off Accidents (2)  
Runway Excursions (3)
Runway Incursions (6)

Tyre Failures (6).  The cause of tyre failures can seldom be proved but under-inflation can be a factor.  Pilots and operators may wish to ascertain that TP’s are checked with reasonable frequency.
Maintenance Reports (10)
Tech Failures Following Maintenance (1)
Taxiing Events (5)
Loss of Coms (4)
IFR Level Bust (3)
Cockpit Smoke (-), CO warning (1)

Brake Failure (-), landing gear indications (4), gear up approach (1).
ATC Coordination of IFR GA Flights (3) 
Bird Strike (1) with airframe damage (helicopter).

Airspace Infringements (95),

T indicates areas where training could be improved effectively.  S suggests that systemic improvements could be implemented.  

In 13 cases IFR traffic was affected i.e. delayed, descent stopped or vectored around the infringer.  .
The relative navigation factor is used for cases where either the believed vertical and horizontal position of the aircraft or the perceived location of the proscribed airspace was in error. This may be termed situational awareness with respect to controlled airspace boundaries.
Airspace categories affected were:
TMA Class A 10
CTA Class D 31
CTA Base 1500ft Class D 19
CTR Class D 9
CTR Class D 8 Arrivals/departures from an airfield wholly or partly within a CTR.  Most relate to EGKR**.
TMZ Class G 8 Incorrect squawk and/or or not listening (6).Most relate to EGSX**.
RMZ Class G 1
ATZ Class G 7 Including gliding sites and para drop zones
Danger Areas 2
RAT 1

Various contributory factors were:
Inadequate planning.(2). T
Weather Factors (4)
Transponders Mode C faulty or over reading* (5). S
Lack of Knowledge (2), transponders. T
Take Two (4). T
Misidentified surface features, lateral navigation error or misread the moving map (2).
Confusion of CAS bases (8), including moving map presentation. S
Chart obscuration (2) cases reported, Farnborough CTR/CTA
Altimetry (2). S.One had the altimeter checked and it was found to be 150ft in error in flight.
Manchester LLR (3). No violation of the boundaries in two cases, report due incorrect squawk.S
North Weald Departures/ Arrivals (8). S**
Moving map failure (2). S
Farnborough CTR/CTA (9)** S
Distractions:- instructing or task (3), tech problems (2), passengers (2)
Instrument scan (5).Lookout, Attitude, Instruments, particularly altimeter and VSI.  Altitude keeping errors are often caused by failing to observe these instruments frequently T.
Frequency Monitoring Code not used or pilot not listening (6) T.
Non-compliance with cleared route or not above altitude (5).
London FIS (6)***.  Guidance as to when this service might be useful is required. S & T.
Glider infringements (3)
RT skills lacking (2)
Misunderstood clearance (1)

No squawk, wrong squawk or departed with xpdr SBY (7). Pilots and operators may wish to review checklists so that Transponder ALT is set for all departures.

*  One report indicates that transponder model Funke TRT 800 has issues whereby some ground based interrogators do not respond whilst others do.  A Service Bulletin applies.  This event occurred at Stansted, where a number of no Mode C reports arise on a monthly basis.  While it is likely that ALT mode was not selected by the pilot in many cases it is also conceivable that Stansted Radar does not always pick up some Mode C signals from aircraft transiting the TMZ at low altitudes.  The lack of knowledge indicated in two reports, that did not affect the infringements as suggested, was that transponders transmit pressure altitude or flight level at all times and the conversion to altitude at and below transition altitude using current QNH is done by the ground station.

** Specific joining and departure instructions for Redhill are not given in the VFR Flight Guide and some of the information is confusing.  E.g. – enter the ATZ on Rwy QDM remaining within the fixed wing circuit area.  That is approximately what one infringer did.  There is more information on the airfield website.  It would be helpful if all GA aerodromes publish information in a standard format and when necessary show arrival and departure routes with concise instructions including squawk and frequency with an area chart.  Similar applies to North Weald EGSX.  If concise arrival and departure routes are published, it is likely that pilots will follow them.  Denham offers a good example.  While websites are useful for current conditions, the joining and departure procedures should ideally be complete and identical on all information sources.

*** Guidance is required regarding use of London FIS.  Several infringements occur each month with aircraft who believe they are receiving a useful service from London FIS, which would seldom be appropriate when flying in the vicinity of or underneath controlled airspace.  One example is of an aircraft southbound from Scotland to Isle of Man.  Scottish FIS advised changing to London FIS which was done and squawk assigned.  The pilot thought they would tell him to change to Ronaldsway; they didn’t so the pilot changed to Ronaldsway anyway but too late to avoid an infringement.  An understandable misunderstanding.  Foreign pilots in particular make the FIS their first call because the frequency is printed large in the marine areas and may then believe that they have done all that is required.